Accounting for counting

They can’t account for counting… Einsteen couldn’t count. I mean he has no philosophy that accounts for the idea that one fact is different from another fact. And if one fact isn’t different from another fact, you can’t count. There has to be some difference between potato one and potato two. Suppose that you are in a coal bin on a dark December night, and you’re looking for a black cat that isn’t there and you are blind… As Hegel said, “this is the night in which all cows are black and all cats are grey.” There is no differentiation.

I’m trying to bring this point home to you, for your consideration. You should not be afraid of any non Christian philosophy. We should not be apologetically presenting our position as though it were just as good as, or better, or a whole lot better. That’s not the issue. The issue is quite the opposite. Ours is alone the basis on which anything can be said intelligently about anything. And if you grant it that the other fellow could even find one fact and distinguish it from another fact, you’re making a fatal concession because then you are admitting that he can predicate to some extent. And if he can predicate intelligently to some extent then there isn’t any reason why he shouldn’t predicate all the way down and account for reality in a way that is as good yours, or maybe even better than yours. Then you are on this better or worse. You’re on probability and improbability.

– Cornelius Van Til, ‘Christ and Human Thought: Church Fathers Part 2‘ from 35:44